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Abstract: The paper commences by reviewing and examining the structure of critical infrastructure systems 
from a holistic viewpoint, before venturing towards determining what are the necessary considerations 
required for modelling a specific system within the layered structural context of the larger holistic system. 
This research outlines the essential considerations required to model a critical infrastructure system and its 
associated sub-systems that represents and compliments the dependency relationships between cooperating 
systems, their distributed nature and associated deadlock issues, where appropriate. Additionally, in order to 
effectively model and represent any subject system it is important to predefine the distinct context boundaries 
of subject system including their sub-systems to reduce or remove the potential influence and implications of 
multiple system variables with potentially multiple values that reside either internally or external of the subject 
system. 
The example scenario presented in the paper is modelled utilising Coloured Petri Nets and represents the 
application of the initial system descriptive considerations to define the system structure, its service provision 
dynamics and illustrates how critical infrastructure systems can be hierarchically modelled, to form the basis 
for further system security analysis 
Keywords: Critical infrastructure, systems, modelling, petri nets 
1. Introduction 
Understanding the complexities and intricacies of a nation's critical infrastructure system is 
necessary in order to protect the integrity of the services they provide to the greater community. 
For instance, Assante's (2008) comparative analogy between infrastructure protection of the 
Roman aqueducts in the ancient world and protection of today's modern infrastructures illustrates 
that the issues surrounding infrastructure protection continue to share commonality. Particularly, 
from the perspective that once an infrastructure is delivering a service, the community tends to 
become increasingly accustomed to and even dependent upon these institutionalised services. 
The underlaying premise is that through their pervasive nature these systems and services 
become critical to an improved standard of living for the greater community. Therefore, it is the 
convenience and availability of the infrastructure system services together with the community's 
expectations that leads to potential social issues when these systems fail or experience a reduced 
level of service supply or availability to the community. Depending upon how and which critical 
infrastructure system or multiple systems is affected, will invariably determine the community 
reaction and influence the likely response contingencies at the governmental, personal and wider 
economical level. 
It is at this point, when the greater community cannot do without the services these systems 
provide that they become critical infrastructures because of the crucial services they deliver to the 
ongOing wealth and well-being of society in general. Therefore, the logical extension of this 
assumption is that service assurance and integrity of the system progressively attains a condition 
that is fundamentally essential to most modern, secure, industrialised and stable societies. 
Additionally, it is from the national security perspective that governments begin to realise the threat 
potential of interrupting, denigrating performance or the destruction of a nation's critical 
infrastructure systems and the potential flow-on effects of such scenarios. So in order to effectively 
plan for and protect critical infrastructure systems, it is imperative that a comprehensive 
understanding of the system structure, operational intricacies, security characteristics and 
vulnerabilities is attained, which is central to developing a considered assessment of the 
soundness of these physically large and geographically distributed systems (TISN 2006). 
To this end, this paper represents the research findings in response to the question, 'what are the· 
considerations necessary for the conceptual modelling of critical infrastructure systems and the 
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implications of applying Coloured Petri Net modelling techniques to modelling systems' 
functionality, security characteristics and dynamic behaviours?' 
In answering this question, it is appropriate to begin scoping the context of the critical infrastructure 
modelling research and explain the Australian perspective and structure of the critical infrastructure 
systems. From this perspective, considerations can be identified that indicate the important 
requirements for the notional representation and conceptual modelling of these systems or parts 
thereof and it is these considerations that enable the conceptual models to potentially deliver 
insight into maintaining system availability, security and service assurance. The next step is to take 
the considerations identified and apply them to the modelling of a critical infrastructure system 
case study that conceptually models the system's normal functionality, security characteristics and 
dynamic behaviours. Where upon through reflective deliberation, the conclusions drawn should 
indicate to what extent the initial research question is effectively answerable and outline any future 
research prospects that may apply the modelling techniques and considerations alluded to here for 
modelling critical infrastructure systems in the Australian context. 
2. Critical infrastructure: the Australian context 
As an island continent, Australia is in a unique position of having its own self-reliant infrastructure 
systems in place and not having to rely wholly upon services delivered from infrastructure sources 
located externally within other nation states. In the Australian context critical infrastructure systems 
generally consist of long thin networks with limited redundancy and capacity for re-routing services 
that is the result of the inordinately large geographical distances that these infrastructure systems, 
in some cases, must traverse to supply remote locations, such as exemplified by water pipelines 
and electricity transmission lines. 
This is particularly relevant when considering the situational environment that uniquely 
distinguishes critical infrastructure systems from the Australian perspective, such as (Pye & 
Warren 2006): 
• 
.. 
• 
" 
II 
An large island continent; 
Minimal sharing or reliance on external infrastructures and services located or provided from 
outside the national border; 
Critical infrastructure systems are spread over a large geographic areas with limited 
populations in remote regions of the country; 
Largely immune from foreign critical infrastructure incidents, although this is not entirely the 
case from a cyber perspective; 
Due to remoteness, there is potential for early warnings regarding externally based incidents 
and perhaps isolation from the effects thereof, but Australia is not itself immune from the 
effects of externally originating incidents and nor can it be expected to totally contain internally 
based incidents; 
The layered structure of critical infrastructure incorporating infrastructures at the global, 
national, state, corporate and personal perspectives that also cut across various sectors within 
these layers. 
Australian critical infrastructure systems are principally considered to be identified as "those 
physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication networks which, if 
destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact 
upon the social or economic well-being of the nation or affect Australia's ability to conduct national 
defence and ensure national security" (AGO p1 2004). This is particularly relevant from an 
Australian perspective concerning the protection of the following sectors of critical infrastructure 
and the systems that underpin these sectors (DPMC 2004): 
• Energy Sector - especially the distribution and delivery systems underpinning the gas, 
petroleum fuels, electricity generation and transmission services; 
• Utilities Sector - particularly the distribution and reticulation of water, waste water and waste 
management strategies; 
.. Transport Sector - involving air, road, sea, rail and inter-modal distribution and exchange 
centres for cargo; 
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Communications Sector - incorporating telecommunications (phone, fax, Internet, cable 
satellites), electronic mass communication (television, radio) and postal services; 
Health Sector - particularly the disaster response management of hospitals, public health 
including research and development laboratories; 
Food Supply Sector - including electronic and physical supply chains, bulk production, storage 
and distribution services; 
Finance Sector - especially the financial and economic systems underpinning banking, 
insurance, and trading exchanges; 
Government Services Sector - focusing on defence and intelligence facilities, both houses of 
parliament, key government departments, foreign missions, principle residences, emergency 
services (police, fire, ambulance and others) responses and nuclear installations; 
National Icons Sector - regarding iconic buildings, culturally significant, sport and tourism; 
Essential Manufacturing Sector - involving the key defence and commercial industries, heavy 
industry and chemicals. 
The structure of Australia's critical infrastructure consists of differing levels of infrastructure that 
incorporate sectors and sub-sector infrastructures at each level within the greater layered 
structure. Determining the global, national, state, corporate and personal levels of critical 
infrastructure tends to ascribe the physical boundaries between levels and allow further 
extrapolation to identify the precise connection points between levels with greater clarity. While the 
identified sectors within each level further delineates the systems and sub-systems to define 
infrastructure ownership; governance obligations; duty of care; maintenance; security 
management, and protection responsibilities (Pye & Warren 2005). 
A principle characteristic of critical infrastructure systems is that the structure of these systems is 
one of interconnection and network so they can function cooperatively to supply and demand 
services to and from each other in varying degrees. It is this structural inter-relationship between 
critical infrastructure systems and the smaller internal components and systems within them, which 
characterises critical infrastructure as a dynamic system made up of smaller independent or reliant 
systems. Subsequently, this behaviour indicates that critical infrastructure systems can be further 
characterised as dynamic systems because they must cope with service demand fluctuations while 
maintaining highly reliant relationships between each other and therefore, by necessity, must 
function together in a cooperative manner so that the system as a whole, can function and supply 
the services normally expected (Pye & Warren 2006). 
However, critical infrastructure systems are vulnerable and can be damaged, destroyed or 
disrupted by breakdowns, negligence, natural disasters, accidents, cyber incidents, illegal criminal 
activity, malicious damage or as the target of both conventional and information warfare to name a 
few. For these reasons and others, the continuity of supply requires protection against such 
hazards, threats, vulnerabilities and risks. Therefore the aim of government policy and, by 
association, that of infrastructure owners and operators, is to ensure continued supply availability 
through identifying and implementing improved protective safeguards and security analysis in 
response to the risks and threats posed (Scott 2005). However, with the recent Federal election 
and the change in government to Labor, the current policies implemented by the previous Liberal 
government remain under review, the focus of critical infrastructure protection and security 
management policy may yet change, and remains unclear. 
3. System modelling benefits 
As previously discussed critical infrastructure systems are physically large, distributed and complex 
systems that are highly networked together with information and communication technology and 
therefore difficult to conceptualise as a whole. Modelling offers analysts the ability to visualise the 
subject system in a virtual software environment and apply various event scenariOS, to speculate 
on the likely propagation of such events, and to postulate the likely impact upon the system/s (AGO 
2004). 
Additionally, modelling offers the potential to assess and predict the possible effects from a number 
of differing perspectives upon the community, environment, business, and governments alike thus 
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enabling the development of strategies and responses to provide contingencies for the following 
premises: 
" Business continuity; 
.. Incident and consequence management; 
II Information system attacks and vulnerabilities; 
II Electronic crime; 
II Protection of key sites from attack or sabotage; 
.. Chemical, biological and radiological threats to water and food supplies; 
" Accident management; 
II Cyber incidents. 
These scenario points although not exclusive, are just a few of the possible scenario areas that still 
require further investigation and modelling, particularly in regard to their potential impact upon the 
following critical infrastructure systems for instance (DPMC 2004): 
II Telecommunication and communication networks; 
II Banking; 
II Energy; 
.. Water and food supplies; 
" Health services; 
" Emergency services; 
• Transport networks. 
Fundamentally, this provides an opportunity to model adverse situations as applied to the critical 
infrastructure systems, without necessarily testing this same adverse scenario situation in the 
physical realm of the infrastructure itself. This in itself is the primary motivation in seeking to pursue 
this research to identify a modelling medium that can adequately incorporate and model the 
characteristics and intricacies of complex critical infrastructure systems. 
4. Research context 
Firstly, the context of this research seeks to identify and establish an answer to what are the key 
considerations that any modeller should consider in examining a critical infrastructure system from 
the perspective of the system's functionality, security and dynamic behaviour. This is necessary to 
define the scope of the system/s or parts thereof and enables a greater focus to on these essential 
system characteristics prior to proceeding to produce a conceptual model of the focal system of 
interest. 
The second part of this research follows on and applies the conceptual modelling of these 
aforementioned considerations into a representative conceptual model of the focal system that 
distinctly models the system's particular characteristics and idiosyncrasies, as exemplified and 
discussed later with the coloured petri net model examples. 
4.1 Generic critical infrastructure system characteristics 
In a generic sense, there are characteristics that are applicable to critical infrastructure systems 
that are common to these systems; this is in part due to the evolving nature of these systems and 
the pervasiveness of information communications technology that has led to increasingly 
interconnected networks. From this perspective, the principle characteristic is that infrastructure 
systems are increaSingly networked for communication and control purposes, so once largely 
autonomous and heterogenous systems can now interact together cooperatively for greater 
efficiency and increased availability, thus delivering higher levels of service delivery. 
The sheer physical size and magnitude incorporating the geographical distance over which some 
infrastructure systems transverse in the Australian context is another characteristic that requires 
consideration, as the remoteness and size does expose these systems to remote physical attack 
and ongoing environmental exposure and system maintenance difficulties. Therefore, the 
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distributed structural orientation of the system itself is an important consideration from the pretext 
of developing a representative system model. 
Additionally, the spatial scalability of critical infrastructure systems requires careful examination 
because systems can consist of numerous autonomous and semi-autonomous systems all working 
cooperatively together as one. This highlights the importance of considering not only the internal 
system dynamics and the internal system influences and responses going on within the overall 
system, but also the external environmental influences on the overall system and its subsequent 
system responses. From this perspective, the granularity of the model is a prime consideration in 
determining the scope of the system complexity and detail of any system model created. 
Furthermore, there is the existence of dependency relationships that exist between cooperating 
critical infrastructure systems and the influences that can exist between dependant and 
interdependent systems (Pye & Warren 2006). 
A key characteristic in modelling critical infrastructure systems is a need to observe the operational 
dynamics of the systems in a scalable manner to model representatively the operational 
parameters of the focal critical infrastructure system in a justified manner. Here it is important to 
critically consider and scope the operational aspects to model as faithfully as possible, including 
conceptually modelling the operational dynamics of the system too. From this perspective, the 
modeller is attempting to utilise the system model to replicate closely the focal system's operation, 
which is crucial to determining likely system responses during normal operational conditions and 
operational responses to adverse system conditions and environmental factors. 
The final fundamental characteristic is the temporal aspects of the critical infrastructure systems. 
With critical infrastructure systems functioning in cooperative and dependent relationships, the time 
scale differences relates directly to the operational functionality of these systems too, from the 
aspect of services transiting across the system from the source to the destination for consumption 
(Rinaldi 2004). Although, creating models of critical infrastructure systems without time 
considerations are beneficial to scoping the system initially. Time does however remain a central 
consideration in how SUb-systems cooperate and interact within the overall system to deliver the 
services they provide. 
Although every system is distinctive with its own set of characteristics and idiosyncrasies, these 
system aspects represent the general considerations any modeller needs to consider concerning 
the faithful modelling a critical infrastructure system or part thereof. This necessitates a careful 
examination and intimate understanding of the existing physical subject system prior to attempting 
to develop any representative conceptual model the subject system, additionally the modelling 
medium must be able represent these specific considerations too. 
4.2 Specific critical infrastructure system modelling considerations 
In briefly discussing and identifying the generic characteristics of Australian critical infrastructure 
systems, the following outlines the specific modelling considerations required for representational 
modelling of the critical infrastructure systems, circumstances and their attributes, as follows: 
" Systematic scoping perspective of the system to be modelled or part thereof and granularity 
detail of hierarchal levels within the subject system; 
" Identifying system criticalness and points of criticalness with the subject system; 
" Systems are generally transitional (services move from source to destination); 
" Systems are distributed in character; 
" Systems operate autonomously or semi-autonomous (typically no central control for 
cooperating sub-systems); 
" Deadlocking issues (transport, communication); 
" System scalability (systems made up of sub-systems) and complexity; 
• Network connected systems (stand alone) systems and the relationships (dependency and 
interdependency); 
" Operational factors and environmental influences (internal and external); 
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• System redundancy and backup systems; 
• Control and communication (critical pathways, Internet); 
" Time (temporal) scale dynamics within and around systems; 
" Depict 'cause and effect' and possible dynamic changes within the system/s; 
" System concurrency issues. 
The ability to model these systems incorporating the considerations above in a relevant context is 
important to assessing the system security, understanding their functionality and dynamic 
behaviours in order to develop strategies that address and maintain the continuity of service. This 
in part relies upon identifying and protecting key points of infrastructure system concentration, 
pinch-points and remote exposures in order to maintain high-levels of service assurance, 
continuity, system availability and short system restoration times. 
4.3 Potential conceptual modelling objectives 
In conceptually modelling critical infrastructure systems, there are potential modelling objectives 
that provide deliverable insights into critical infrastructure systems and modelling should strive to 
deliver from the perspective of system functionality, security characteristics and dynamic behaviour 
but not limited to the following (CIPMA 2007): 
" Identify system scope, interconnections between systems both within and across critical 
infrastructure sectors incorporating levels of scale and future system scalability; 
" Deliver inSights into the system behaviours and responses of complex networks and their 
communication, control and service provision dynamics; 
" Identify and analyse the extent and influential magnitude of relationships between cooperating 
systems, particularly from the aspect of dependency and interdependency relationships; 
" Observe through applied modelling, normal system functionality and predict the potential flow-
on effects of critical infrastructure system failure and likely cascading impacts; 
• Identify potential system choke points, single points of failure and other likely security 
vulnerabilities; 
• Model assessments of potential security measures for systems prior to their physical 
implementation; 
• Apply risk and security mitigation strategies to test and evaluate the beneficial or otherwise 
outcome likelihoods for continuity planning and development; 
II Models must be conceptually presentative of the physically distributed nature and functionality 
characteristics of the subject infrastructure systems. 
Understanding and appreciating the characteristics and idiosyncrasies of critical infrastructure 
systems and the more specific considerations are the foundations upon which the conceptual 
modelling of these systems can deliver the modelling objectives as listed previously. Therefore, the 
modelling of such systems demands of the modeller an intimate understanding and appreciation of 
the complexities of subject systems to deliver a representative and well-scoped model, for without 
the knowledge gleaned from studying these systems from the perspectives listed, then any 
subsequent model produced cannot be a representative model. 
The next logical consideration is the modelling medium to utilise that can adequately model the 
characteristics, idiosyncrasies and specific considerations of critical infrastructure systems and for 
this research project Coloured Petri Nets, is the chosen modelling medium. 
S. Modelling systems with coloured petri nets 
Systems modelling is typically applied to gain a virtual insight into the subject system and from the 
perspective of this research coloured petri net modelling is the modelling medium applied. 
Principally, coloured petri nets are utilised at the computer science end of the spectrum for 
modelling and validating systems in which concurrency, communication, time, distribution and 
synchronisation playa role (Jensen et al 2007) focusing predominately on computer network 
communication protocol and workflow modelling. By contrast, this research applies these same 
coloured petri net modelling principles to physically large and distributed systems to examine the 
190 
Graeme Pye and Matthew Warren 
structure, functionality and dynamic behaviour of Australian critical infrastructure systems from the 
perspective of service assurance availability and system security characteristics. 
In justification terms, coloured petri nets offer a modelling technique that is mathematically defined 
for the specification, design, analysis, verification and performance evaluation of concurrent 
distributed systems. This modelling medium provides a visualisation of the system semantics as 
conceptually perceived by mod eller, which facilitates the understanding of both the information 
transitions and control flows within the subject system and describes the states of the system and 
the events that can influence and cause the system to change states (Jensen 1997). 
Similarly, the characteristics of critical infrastructures systems in most cases represents the 
transition of services from a source across the system to a destination for consumption 
incorporating various system states in relation to communication and control, are distributed in 
architecture, can display issues of concurrency, synchronisation and time. The following coloured 
petri net model examples developed using CPNTools modelling software illustrates in relatively 
Simplistic terms how applied coloured petri nets can virtually model a critical infrastructure system. 
6. Energy sector coloured petri net examples 
The following coloured petri net model examples represent the conceptual representation of part of 
a larger electriCity supply grid incorporating the infrastructures of raw materials supply, electricity 
generation and the transmission infrastructures that all function cooperatively to distribute 
electricity from the source to the destination for consumption. 
This modelling example utilises the CPNTools software package that is the result of twenty years 
development by the CPN Group of researchers led by Professor Kurt Jensen at the University of 
Aarhus in Denmark and is the current generation software tool for modelling within the medium of 
coloured petri nets. 
6.1 Model notation 
As with any type of modelling there is a need to describe the representative notation utilised within 
the model to facilitate model comprehension and the following coloured petri net notations as 
illustrated in Figure 1 and described in brief below. Note also that each of Tabs (pages) in Figure 1 
represents part of the underlaying SUb-system modelled at a lower level than the system context 
level shown here. 
Figure 1: Coloured petri net modelling as shown with CPNTools modelling software. 
A Place (oval) in Figure 1 are representing the various physical infrastructures within the system 
and is occupied by tokens representing the state of the physical infrastructure and the shift of 
services (represented by tokens) across the infrastructure system from one physical infrastructure 
(place) to another. 
Tokens (numbered green dots and text) as shown in Figure 1, notate different types (termed 
colours) of services traversing across the system and occupying places to indicate the state and 
presence of a service at a particular physical infrastructure (place). 
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Transitions (rectangles) in Figure 1 broadly represent the actions between places to transition a 
token from one place to another place within the system and therefore, model the change in states 
of the places throughout the system model, as the tokens traverse the system. It should be noted 
that the transitions (Double-lined border) shown in Figure 1 are representing hierarchical 
transitions and indicate the existence of an underlaying sub-system as modelled on subsequent 
sub-pages (Tabs). 
The arcs (arrows) in Figure 1 represent the direction and connection between the physical 
infrastructures (places) and the infrastructure actions (transitions) within the infrastructure system 
as modelled. 
In summary, the modelling of systems with coloured petri net modelling techniques dictates that 
actions within the system are modelled by transitions and the occurrence of an action is modelled 
by the firing of a transition. This is conditional upon all the connected preceding places are 
currently holding a token and when this condition is true, then a transition can fire and a token 
positioned in the next subsequent place. Sequences of actions are therefore, modelled by 
sequences of transitions firing and tokens positioned in places as associated with the occurrence 
of an event, resulting in the consuming of a resource (token), passing a resource (token) or the 
generation of other new resources (tokens). 
6.2 Critical infrastructure system: case study 
The following coloured petri net examples represent a case study of the 220Kv Electricity 
Generation and Transmission Grid that supplies electricity to a local Aluminium Smelter at Point 
Henry. The Smelter is supplied from two power generation sources, the dominate power source 
providing 60 percent of the smelter's normal power requirements is obtained from the coal-fired 
power generation and transmission infrastructure from the Latrobe Valley. The secondary power 
source provides the remaining 40 percent of the smelter's normal power requirements, which is 
received from the smelter's own Coal-fired power generator and transmission infrastructure from 
nearby Anglesea. 
It terms of criticality the supply of raw materials for power generation, transmission and associated 
infrastructures are crucial to maintaining a continuous supply of electricity in order to maintain 
production and keep the aluminium in the smelting 'pots' liquid. If all power was lost to the smelter 
production for in excess of 48hrs, then the chances of economical and production recovery 
become irrecoverable resulting in loss of investment, jobs and the economical benefits to the 
broader community. 
It should be noted that the temporal or time scale characteristics of the various systems as 
modelled here is not taken into consideration with the models presented here and is currently 
outside the scope of this research. 
6.3 Conceptual model: normal system scenario 
The following Figure 2 is the coloured petri net model depicting the normal operational from the 
overall system context perspective of the smelter and the associated raw material supply, power 
generation and power transmission infrastructure without the implications of various system time 
scales. 
It can be observed from this model that the tokens labelled 'LV_Normal' and 'A_Normal' are 
representing the transition of electricity services for the Latrobe Valley and Anglesea sources 
respectively to the destination at the Point Henry Smelter. This model therefore conceptually 
represents the normal functionality of all infrastructure systems working together to achieve the 
desired goal. 
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Figure 2: Conceptual coloured petri net model of normal infrastructure function (system context 
view) 
6.4 Conceptual model: adverse system scenario 
The following Figures 3 and 4 are coloured petri net models depicting operational fault initially from 
the system context perspective to the transmission view of the infrastructure where the fault is 
situated. 
Figure 3:. Conceptual coloured petri net model of an infrastructure fault (system context view). 
As illustrated in Figure 3 there is the appearance of a 'Fault' token within the context perspective of 
the model and this would indicate that a problem has occurred within the system that is not of a 
normal expectation. However, as there are still the existing tokens 'A_Normal' and "LV_Normal' 
transitioning to the 'Point Henry' smelter place in this model thus indicating that electrical power is 
still reaching the destination from the source. This situation indicates that a fault has occurred 
within the system although; its affect is of a minor nature, as it has not adversely influenced the 
system's normal function to the extent where it is disrupting the system's normal service provision. 
Upon further investigation, the 'Fault' token is traceable back through the model from the 
destination place 'Point Henry' to ascertain that the system fault is likely to reside in the sub-
systems supporting the 'Transmission' (Tab) transition, as the 'Fault' token initially appears at the 
'Rowville' place in the model. 
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Figure 4: Conceptual coloured petri net model of an infrastructure fault (transmission view). 
Figure 4 indicates that upon viewing the sub-systems underpinning the 'Transmission' transition, it 
is evident that the absence of any 'LV_Normal' token in the 'Feed1' infrastructure denotes that this 
is where the fault exists on the arc 'Fault(bad)'. This fault is representing a physical failure of that 
particular part of the electrical transmission infrastructure that distributes the power from 'Latrobe 
Valley' to 'Rowville' and beyond. Additionally, what is also evident here in Figure 4 is the 
transmission redundancy existing within the system and the potential security pinch-point that 
exists within the system model at the place representing the 'Rowville' infrastructure as a 
convergence of the transmission infrastructure to a specific single location. 
These coloured petri net examples represent an initial attempt to model conceptually a number of 
cooperating infrastructure systems and although somewhat simplistic, it does indicate that there is 
potential to model critical infrastructure systems in this manner. Additionally from these models, it 
becomes evident where there is system redundancy (Figure 4) to support continued service 
provision and where the potential pinch-points exist within the systems are located as potential 
security vulnerabilities. 
7. Conceptual modelling and considerations 
In reflecting on these coloured petri net models as exemplified in light of the considerations 
previously identified and giving careful thought to modelling critical infrastructure systems in this 
manner, it is apparent that coloured petri nets offer a modelling methodology and system insights 
worthy of further analysis for modelling these crucial systems. 
From the perspective of the modelling considerations appropriate to address the complexities of 
critical infrastructure systems previously identified, coloured petri net modelling for the most part 
addresses and where applicable incorporates these considerations into the system model. For 
instance, in this model the modeller's scope of the overall system incorporates a number of 
infrastructures cooperating to transition services from the point of origin or creation to the 
destination for consumption. Furthermore, by modelling these systems in a hierarchical manner, 
although the granularity of the model itself remained high-level in presentation, enables model 
viewing at a context or overall perspective and enable the viewer the opportunity to 'drill-down' for 
more specific sUb-system detail and complexity. 
This enables the viewer to develop an appreciation of the distributed nature of the systems, the 
network connections necessary to deliver services, system scalability and the existing dependency 
relationships between cooperating critical infrastructure systems. Furthermore, it becomes obvious 
to the viewer just where system redundancy does and does not exist and where obvious system 
pinch-points and system security vulnerabilities are likely to reside within the system. 
However, what is not taken into consideration and therefore not depicted in the examples 
presented here is the transition of the services across the network from a system simulation 
perspective, any potential concurrency and deadlocking issues or the temporal and fluctuating load 
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characteristics applicable to any electricity delivery system. Nevertheless, coloured petri modelling 
with CPNTools software can incorporate these conditions and is capable of modelling these critical 
infrastructure considerations. 
As with any conceptual modelling, the final product remains the dictate of the modeller's view and 
interpretation of the system and therefore the scope of the model representing the larger physical 
system is limited, but remains open for debate and discussion. The models presented in this paper 
are formative research examples that illustrate the potential of coloured petri nets for application in 
modelling other critical infrastructure systems in alternative detail and from differing perspectives. 
8. Conclusion 
At this stage, coloured petri nets appear to answer the aforementioned research question to 
incorporate and model the critical infrastructure systems' considerations as identified in the 
modelling examples presented here. However, ongoing research and model testing will determine 
the suitability and potential benefits of coloured petri nets for representational modelling of critical 
infrastructure systems in greater complexity, but a tighter initial system analysis method is still 
required. 
The modelling examples presented in this paper remain conceptually high-level in their depiction of 
this particular infrastructure system and do not take into consideration the control and 
communication systems that underpin and coordinate the various infrastructures responsible for 
delivering power from the source to the destination. Further model complexity will result with 
incorporating control and communication systems into models like these, but the hierarchical and 
scalability aspects of the coloured petri net modelling software, CPNTools would enable a fuller 
appreciation of these system intricacies that remain crucially important critical infrastructure system 
issues and the subject of further research. 
The considerations for modelling critical infrastructure systems identified here remain central to the 
successful modelling of critical infrastructure systems and to a large extent coloured petri nets offer 
the potential to address and model these considerations. Furthermore, as a modelling medium via 
CPNTools, coloured petri nets offer the modeller and analyst the means to model and experiment 
with the operational system functionality, to incorporate and conceptually test the security 
characteristics and observe dynamic behaviours and responses via the system models. Thereby, 
enabling the development and assessment of contingency plans for conceptual testing to protect, 
minimise risk and improve service assurance and availability of the subject critical infrastructure 
system. 
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